merge: GEN2-SECRETS-001 into delegated authority
# Conflicts: # deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml # dev/ACTIVE_TASK.json # docs/CREDENTIALS_AND_SECRETS.md
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@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@ Each privileged runtime gets only its required secret/capability bindings. `comm
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The Core SELF learning repository uses the existing `assistant_core_secrets` volume and credential-reference mechanism with `self_role` and `credential://domovoy/self/db-password/v1`. The secret is consumed from the fixed `/run/secrets/self_db_password` path; its value is never placed in Compose environment, Git, logs or ordinary configuration. The role and schema already exist; this wiring does not create a role or broaden privileges.
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Delegated non-interactive control-plane work is separately authenticated. The external `assistant_core_secrets` control plane must materialize `control_plane_service_token`, mode `0400`, for `core-runtime` and the existing Authority/Commit runtime only. Compose carries only `credential://domovoy/control-plane/service-token/v1`; trusted runtimes resolve the fixed file below `/run/secrets`. The service token is not a Creator session, cannot impersonate a human, and must be rotated or withdrawn in the secret backend. Removing the token disables new delegated operations; revoking the durable Authority grant also blocks them without deleting audit history.
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Delegated non-interactive control-plane work is separately authenticated. The local `secret-control-plane` one-shot control-plane service provisions `control_plane_service_token` with `crypto/rand` into the dedicated external `assistant_control_plane_service_secrets` volume. The token artifact is mode `0400`; metadata and audit are separate protected files and contain no value or reversible fingerprint. Only `core-runtime` and the existing Authority/Commit runtime mount that volume read-only at `/run/control-plane-secrets`; no model, Skill, SELF, creator-web, cognitive-worker or research-runtime receives the mount. Compose carries only the non-secret credential reference `credential://domovoy/control-plane/service-token/v1`.
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The provisioner is idempotent: restart reuses an existing safe active artifact. Rotation creates a new value by atomic replacement, records non-secret metadata/audit, and never accepts a plaintext environment variable. The service token is not a Creator session, cannot impersonate a human, and never grants Authority by itself. Removing or rotating the token disables/refreshes service authentication; revoking the durable Authority grant also blocks new delegated operations without deleting audit history.
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Creator authentication secrets are stored in the external Docker volume `assistant_core_secrets` and mounted read-only only at `/run/secrets` in `core-runtime`. The production container environment contains `_FILE` paths, not the secret values. Files are owned by runtime uid 100/gid 101 with mode 0400. `CREATOR_USERNAME` is not secret and remains an environment value. Development may continue to use direct environment values, but a direct value and its matching `_FILE` setting must never be configured together.
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
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# GEN2-SECRETS-001 — local machine credential provisioning
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Date: 2026-08-31
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## Design evidence
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`platform/secrets` is the existing technical protected-file mechanism. This
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task extends it without adding a semantic Secrets owner, a database table, or
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a Configuration/Memory writer.
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The dedicated Docker volume is named
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`assistant_control_plane_service_secrets`. Its sole writer is the one-shot
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`secret-control-plane` control-plane container. Its only consumers are
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`core-runtime` and `commit-runtime`, mounted read-only at
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`/run/control-plane-secrets`. The metadata directory is distinct from the
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token artifact and records purpose, owner, version, consumers, status,
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generation method, and non-secret audit actions only.
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The provisioner uses `crypto/rand`, writes via an atomic file replacement,
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and has no plaintext environment input. It reports only safe operation status.
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The data policy marks the artifact as not indexable, embeddable, retrievable,
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or model-visible.
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## Local FAST evidence
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The following checks completed successfully before production execution:
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- targeted `go test ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
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- targeted `go vet ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
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- POSIX shell regression for the provisioning wrapper, executed under Git
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Bash because the Windows WSL shim cannot translate the mapped workspace;
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- static Docker Compose validation for production and candidate files.
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No credential value, fingerprint, length, header, or plaintext environment
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value was read, printed, copied, committed, or included in this evidence.
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## Production control-plane evidence
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The one-shot provisioner was run from a detached `gen2-integration` worktree
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on `docker.cin.su`. It created the dedicated external volume and provisioned
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the credential once. A repeat `ensure` reported that the already active
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artifact was reused. A bounded owner-requested rotation then completed.
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For creation, idempotent ensure, and rotation, the stable Core, Commit,
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Creator Web, Cognitive Worker, and Research Runtime container identities were
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recorded before and after the one-shot operation and were unchanged. The
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verification checked only artifact and separate metadata/audit file presence;
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it did not read their content.
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At this point the credential is provisioned but not yet used by the stable
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runtime. Consumer mount and service-authentication acceptance are completed
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only when `GEN2-AUTHORITY-001` is merged and deployed as its own controlled
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candidate ReleaseSet.
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