merge: GEN2-SECRETS-001 into delegated authority

# Conflicts:
#	deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml
#	dev/ACTIVE_TASK.json
#	docs/CREDENTIALS_AND_SECRETS.md
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# GEN2-SECRETS-001 — local machine credential provisioning
Date: 2026-08-31
## Design evidence
`platform/secrets` is the existing technical protected-file mechanism. This
task extends it without adding a semantic Secrets owner, a database table, or
a Configuration/Memory writer.
The dedicated Docker volume is named
`assistant_control_plane_service_secrets`. Its sole writer is the one-shot
`secret-control-plane` control-plane container. Its only consumers are
`core-runtime` and `commit-runtime`, mounted read-only at
`/run/control-plane-secrets`. The metadata directory is distinct from the
token artifact and records purpose, owner, version, consumers, status,
generation method, and non-secret audit actions only.
The provisioner uses `crypto/rand`, writes via an atomic file replacement,
and has no plaintext environment input. It reports only safe operation status.
The data policy marks the artifact as not indexable, embeddable, retrievable,
or model-visible.
## Local FAST evidence
The following checks completed successfully before production execution:
- targeted `go test ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
- targeted `go vet ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
- POSIX shell regression for the provisioning wrapper, executed under Git
Bash because the Windows WSL shim cannot translate the mapped workspace;
- static Docker Compose validation for production and candidate files.
No credential value, fingerprint, length, header, or plaintext environment
value was read, printed, copied, committed, or included in this evidence.
## Production control-plane evidence
The one-shot provisioner was run from a detached `gen2-integration` worktree
on `docker.cin.su`. It created the dedicated external volume and provisioned
the credential once. A repeat `ensure` reported that the already active
artifact was reused. A bounded owner-requested rotation then completed.
For creation, idempotent ensure, and rotation, the stable Core, Commit,
Creator Web, Cognitive Worker, and Research Runtime container identities were
recorded before and after the one-shot operation and were unchanged. The
verification checked only artifact and separate metadata/audit file presence;
it did not read their content.
At this point the credential is provisioned but not yet used by the stable
runtime. Consumer mount and service-authentication acceptance are completed
only when `GEN2-AUTHORITY-001` is merged and deployed as its own controlled
candidate ReleaseSet.