diff --git a/docs/evidence/gen2-authority-001-secret-capability-gap-2026-08-31.md b/docs/evidence/gen2-authority-001-secret-capability-gap-2026-08-31.md index b1dfc9f..d42430d 100644 --- a/docs/evidence/gen2-authority-001-secret-capability-gap-2026-08-31.md +++ b/docs/evidence/gen2-authority-001-secret-capability-gap-2026-08-31.md @@ -1,20 +1,12 @@ -# GEN2-AUTHORITY-001 — protected service credential prerequisite +# GEN2-AUTHORITY-001 — delegated control-plane deployment evidence Date: 2026-08-31 -The existing `assistant_core_secrets` volume was inspected by filename only. -It contains the established Creator, Epistemics, Interaction, Local gateway, -SELF and Work artifacts, but no `control_plane_service_token` artifact. - -No secret value was read, copied, printed or inferred. The implementation is -fail-closed: Core and `commit-runtime` remain healthy while the delegated path -returns unavailable/denied until the external secret control plane materializes -the credential reference `credential://domovoy/control-plane/service-token/v1` -at `/run/secrets/control_plane_service_token` for those two trusted runtimes. - -This is a `BLOCKED_BY_MISSING_CAPABILITY` for live non-interactive acceptance, -not a reason to use a Creator session, password, browser cookie, SQL update, or -broader service authority. +The former missing-credential prerequisite is resolved by +`GEN2-SECRETS-001`. A local one-shot provisioner created the dedicated +protected artifact and verified idempotent ensure/rotation without reading or +emitting its value. Core and Commit are wired to resolve it from the dedicated +read-only mount, not the shared secret volume. ## Implemented and verified locally @@ -35,6 +27,24 @@ values: - task preflight, diff scope, independent governance, and architecture checks; - `git diff --check`. -The only missing external capability is protected materialization of -`control_plane_service_token` for Core and Commit runtime. No deployment or -privileged lifecycle request was attempted while it is absent. +## Current deployment-control gap + +No delegated lifecycle operation has been attempted in production. + +On 2026-08-31 the stable Core and Commit runtimes both reported release +revision `2ee5da81145cdad2da1c92c24a91145ad4af61a5`. The existing candidate +slot script declares exactly four components: Creator Web, Core, Cognitive +Worker, and Research Runtime. It has no candidate Commit runtime. + +The Authority endpoint is intentionally served by Commit runtime. Therefore a +candidate Core cannot perform a real delegated Authority request against the +required matching candidate Commit runtime without either recreating stable +Commit (forbidden) or extending the candidate ReleaseSet/Supervisor contract +to contain Commit as an independently healthy and rollback-aware component. + +This is `BLOCKED_BY_SPEC_GAP`, not a credential or implementation failure. A +new explicit packet/revision must authorize the minimum deployment paths: +`deploy/docker-compose.candidate-slot.yml`, `deploy/run-production-canary.sh`, +and the Supervisor release-set contract/tests if its fixed four-component +schema must change. The change must define Commit candidate health, revision +consistency, traffic/promotion behavior, and whole-ReleaseSet rollback.