merge: sync cognitive remediation with integration
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@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ Each privileged runtime gets only its required secret/capability bindings. `comm
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The Core SELF learning repository uses the existing `assistant_core_secrets` volume and credential-reference mechanism with `self_role` and `credential://domovoy/self/db-password/v1`. The secret is consumed from the fixed `/run/secrets/self_db_password` path; its value is never placed in Compose environment, Git, logs or ordinary configuration. The role and schema already exist; this wiring does not create a role or broaden privileges.
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Delegated non-interactive control-plane work is separately authenticated. The local `secret-control-plane` one-shot control-plane service provisions `control_plane_service_token` with `crypto/rand` into the dedicated external `assistant_control_plane_service_secrets` volume. The token artifact is mode `0400`; metadata and audit are separate protected files and contain no value or reversible fingerprint. Only `core-runtime` and the existing Authority/Commit runtime mount that volume read-only at `/run/control-plane-secrets`; no model, Skill, SELF, creator-web, cognitive-worker or research-runtime receives the mount. Compose carries only the non-secret credential reference `credential://domovoy/control-plane/service-token/v1`.
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The provisioner is idempotent: restart reuses an existing safe active artifact. Rotation creates a new value by atomic replacement, records non-secret metadata/audit, and never accepts a plaintext environment variable. The service token is not a Creator session, cannot impersonate a human, and never grants Authority by itself. Removing or rotating the token disables/refreshes service authentication; revoking the durable Authority grant also blocks new delegated operations without deleting audit history.
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Creator authentication secrets are stored in the external Docker volume `assistant_core_secrets` and mounted read-only only at `/run/secrets` in `core-runtime`. The production container environment contains `_FILE` paths, not the secret values. Files are owned by runtime uid 100/gid 101 with mode 0400. `CREATOR_USERNAME` is not secret and remains an environment value. Development may continue to use direct environment values, but a direct value and its matching `_FILE` setting must never be configured together.
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The PostgreSQL off-host backup passphrase is generated randomly and stored as CurrentUser DPAPI ciphertext at `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Domovoy\postgres-backup-key.dpapi.json`. An atomic copy of that DPAPI ciphertext, never the plaintext passphrase, is retained at `\\nas\MST\codex\_backups\domovoy\keys\postgres-backup-key.dpapi.json`. The passphrase is never stored in Git, the production Docker host, a scheduled-task argument, or NAS plaintext. The NAS backup directory receives only GnuPG AES-256 ciphertext and a non-secret integrity manifest. Recovery therefore requires both the NAS artifacts and the authorized Windows DPAPI profile.
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@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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# GEN2-AUTHORITY-001 — delegated control-plane deployment evidence
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Date: 2026-08-31
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The former missing-credential prerequisite is resolved by
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`GEN2-SECRETS-001`. A local one-shot provisioner created the dedicated
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protected artifact and verified idempotent ensure/rotation without reading or
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emitting its value. Core and Commit are wired to resolve it from the dedicated
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read-only mount, not the shared secret volume.
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## Implemented and verified locally
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The bounded implementation is present on branch
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`gen2/authority-001-delegated-control-plane`. It keeps Identity as the service
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identity owner, Authority as the durable grant/revocation/audit owner, and
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Capability as the cognitive lifecycle owner. Core is an Authority-runtime
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client; the Authority endpoint is served by the existing Commit runtime that
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already owns the Authority repository in the V2 runtime topology.
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On 2026-08-31 the following checks completed successfully without secret
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values:
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- targeted `go test` for Authority contracts/domain, secret resolver, Core,
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Commit runtime, and the Authority PostgreSQL adapter;
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- targeted `go vet` for the same packages;
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- production and candidate Compose static validation;
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- task preflight, diff scope, independent governance, and architecture checks;
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- `git diff --check`.
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## Current deployment-control gap
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No delegated lifecycle operation has been attempted in production.
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On 2026-08-31 the stable Core and Commit runtimes both reported release
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revision `2ee5da81145cdad2da1c92c24a91145ad4af61a5`. The existing candidate
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slot script declares exactly four components: Creator Web, Core, Cognitive
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Worker, and Research Runtime. It has no candidate Commit runtime.
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The Authority endpoint is intentionally served by Commit runtime. Therefore a
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candidate Core cannot perform a real delegated Authority request against the
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required matching candidate Commit runtime without either recreating stable
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Commit (forbidden) or extending the candidate ReleaseSet/Supervisor contract
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to contain Commit as an independently healthy and rollback-aware component.
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This is `BLOCKED_BY_SPEC_GAP`, not a credential or implementation failure. A
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new explicit packet/revision must authorize the minimum deployment paths:
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`deploy/docker-compose.candidate-slot.yml`, `deploy/run-production-canary.sh`,
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and the Supervisor release-set contract/tests if its fixed four-component
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schema must change. The change must define Commit candidate health, revision
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consistency, traffic/promotion behavior, and whole-ReleaseSet rollback.
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
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# GEN2-CAPABILITY-001 notification receiver classification
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## Evidence
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The notification target is implemented by this repository's
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`cmd/notification-receiver` runtime. It exposes the bounded delivery and
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receipt protocol used by `adapters/notificationexecutor`; it is therefore an
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Assistant ReleaseComponent, not a shared external service.
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The current stable receiver persists idempotent receipts and is configured
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with separate read/write secrets. Candidate acceptance must not reuse its
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runtime instance, secret mount, or stable Capability ACTIVE binding.
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## Candidate decision
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The candidate ReleaseSet requires its own `notification-receiver-candidate`
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instance in explicit shadow mode. That instance accepts only synthetic,
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task-scoped delivery traffic and returns a shadow receipt. It has no
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production delivery credential or production destination route.
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`SHADOW_CAPTURED` proves only receipt capture. It is not delivery, a sent
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notification, or a verified World outcome.
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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
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# GEN2-DEPLOY-004 r2 — candidate dependency-closure finding
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## Decision and graph evidence
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The owner-approved r2 rule requires every versioned Assistant runtime reached
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by normal candidate operation to be in the candidate ReleaseSet. Static
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runtime configuration establishes this candidate closure:
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```text
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creator-web -> core-runtime, continuity-runtime, commit-runtime,
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cognitive-worker, agent-worker
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core-runtime -> cognitive-worker, research-runtime, continuity-runtime,
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commit-runtime
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commit-runtime -> core-runtime, continuity-runtime
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continuity-runtime -> core-runtime, commit-runtime
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agent-worker -> task-verifier, agent-execution-bridge
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agent-execution-bridge -> cognitive-worker, work-graph-runtime, task-verifier
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work-graph-runtime -> core-runtime
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```
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Therefore the static closure is: Creator Web, Core Runtime, Cognitive Worker,
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Research Runtime, Commit Runtime, Continuity Runtime, Agent Worker, Agent
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Execution Bridge, Work Graph Runtime, and Task Verifier.
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PostgreSQL, protected secret volumes, the local model gateway/lifeboat, and
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the configured web-search endpoint are classified as shared durable
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infrastructure or shared external services. They do not contain an Assistant
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semantic/runtime release revision.
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## Blocking dynamic dependency
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Commit's normal prospective-notification operation obtains the exact active
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notification Capability binding from Core. The binding's immutable
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`HTTPSOrigin`, delivery path, and revision select the receiver. This is not a
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Compose environment URL and cannot be safely redirected by a container alias.
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Consequently, with the existing active binding, a candidate Commit executing a
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normal notification operation would call the stable notification receiver. A
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candidate notification-receiver container alone does not solve the problem:
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the candidate would still resolve the stable binding. Reusing the stable name
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would create ambiguous network routing, and changing the active binding would
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mutate Capability-owned canonical state.
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No runtime, Capability state, migration, secret, or production container was
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changed while establishing this finding.
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## Required owner decision
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Choose one governed boundary before DEPLOY-004 implementation can prove full
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dependency isolation:
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1. authorize a bounded Capability-owned candidate binding/shadow-binding
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lifecycle, including its authority, rollback and selection semantics; or
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2. explicitly classify the notification receiver as a shared external service
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for this ReleaseSet, despite it being an Assistant-managed runtime.
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The first option requires a new packet revision with the exact Capability
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contract/owner paths. The second changes the release-boundary policy and must
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be accepted explicitly. No direct binding update, stable alias reuse, or
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candidate-to-stable shortcut is an acceptable substitute.
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
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# GEN2-SECRETS-001 — local machine credential provisioning
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Date: 2026-08-31
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## Design evidence
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`platform/secrets` is the existing technical protected-file mechanism. This
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task extends it without adding a semantic Secrets owner, a database table, or
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a Configuration/Memory writer.
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The dedicated Docker volume is named
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`assistant_control_plane_service_secrets`. Its sole writer is the one-shot
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`secret-control-plane` control-plane container. Its only consumers are
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`core-runtime` and `commit-runtime`, mounted read-only at
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`/run/control-plane-secrets`. The metadata directory is distinct from the
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token artifact and records purpose, owner, version, consumers, status,
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generation method, and non-secret audit actions only.
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The provisioner uses `crypto/rand`, writes via an atomic file replacement,
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and has no plaintext environment input. It reports only safe operation status.
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The data policy marks the artifact as not indexable, embeddable, retrievable,
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or model-visible.
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## Local FAST evidence
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The following checks completed successfully before production execution:
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- targeted `go test ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
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- targeted `go vet ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
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- POSIX shell regression for the provisioning wrapper, executed under Git
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Bash because the Windows WSL shim cannot translate the mapped workspace;
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- static Docker Compose validation for production and candidate files.
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No credential value, fingerprint, length, header, or plaintext environment
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value was read, printed, copied, committed, or included in this evidence.
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## Production control-plane evidence
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The one-shot provisioner was run from a detached `gen2-integration` worktree
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on `docker.cin.su`. It created the dedicated external volume and provisioned
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the credential once. A repeat `ensure` reported that the already active
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artifact was reused. A bounded owner-requested rotation then completed.
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For creation, idempotent ensure, and rotation, the stable Core, Commit,
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Creator Web, Cognitive Worker, and Research Runtime container identities were
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recorded before and after the one-shot operation and were unchanged. The
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verification checked only artifact and separate metadata/audit file presence;
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it did not read their content.
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At this point the credential is provisioned but not yet used by the stable
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runtime. Consumer mount and service-authentication acceptance are completed
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only when `GEN2-AUTHORITY-001` is merged and deployed as its own controlled
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candidate ReleaseSet.
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