This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
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package main
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import (
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"flag"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"strings"
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platformsecrets "git.cin.su/m/Assistant/platform/secrets"
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)
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const (
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defaultRoot = "/run/control-plane-secrets"
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defaultRuntimeUID = 100
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defaultRuntimeGID = 101
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)
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func main() {
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reason := flag.String("reason", "", "rotation reason: owner-requested-rotation or exposure-detected")
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flag.Parse()
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if flag.NArg() != 1 {
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fail("usage: secret-control-plane [ensure|rotate]")
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}
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store, err := platformsecrets.NewLocalMachineCredentialStore(defaultRoot, defaultRuntimeUID, defaultRuntimeGID, nil)
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if err != nil {
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fail("control-plane credential store unavailable")
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}
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spec := platformsecrets.ControlPlaneServiceTokenSpec()
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switch strings.TrimSpace(flag.Arg(0)) {
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case "ensure":
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result, err := store.Ensure(spec)
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if err != nil {
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fail("control-plane credential provisioning failed")
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}
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if result.Created {
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fmt.Println("control-plane credential provisioned")
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return
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}
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fmt.Println("control-plane credential already active")
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case "rotate":
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if !validRotationReason(*reason) {
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fail("rotation reason is invalid")
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}
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if _, err := store.Rotate(spec, *reason); err != nil {
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fail("control-plane credential rotation failed")
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}
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fmt.Println("control-plane credential rotated")
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default:
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fail("unsupported control-plane credential operation")
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}
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}
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func validRotationReason(reason string) bool {
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switch strings.TrimSpace(reason) {
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case "owner-requested-rotation", "exposure-detected":
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return true
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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func fail(message string) {
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fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, message)
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os.Exit(1)
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
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package main
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import "testing"
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func TestSecretControlPlaneDefaultsUseDedicatedProtectedRoot(t *testing.T) {
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if defaultRoot != "/run/control-plane-secrets" || defaultRuntimeUID <= 0 || defaultRuntimeGID <= 0 {
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t.Fatal("unsafe control-plane defaults")
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}
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}
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func TestRotationReasonsAreBoundedAndNeverArbitraryDiagnosticText(t *testing.T) {
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if !validRotationReason("owner-requested-rotation") || !validRotationReason("exposure-detected") || validRotationReason("Bearer secret-value") {
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t.Fatal("unsafe rotation reason validation")
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}
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}
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@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ type CredentialRef string
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type SecretPurpose string
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const (
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SecretPurposeDatabasePassword SecretPurpose = "DATABASE_PASSWORD"
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SecretPurposeProviderAPIKey SecretPurpose = "PROVIDER_API_KEY"
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SecretPurposeDatabasePassword SecretPurpose = "DATABASE_PASSWORD"
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SecretPurposeProviderAPIKey SecretPurpose = "PROVIDER_API_KEY"
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SecretPurposeServiceAuthentication SecretPurpose = "SERVICE_AUTHENTICATION"
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)
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// RuntimeConsumer identifies a trusted runtime allowed to resolve a credential.
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@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@ type RuntimeConsumer string
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const (
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RuntimeConsumerCore RuntimeConsumer = "core-runtime"
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RuntimeConsumerCommit RuntimeConsumer = "commit-runtime"
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RuntimeConsumerWorkWorker RuntimeConsumer = "agent-worker"
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RuntimeConsumerEpistemicsWorker RuntimeConsumer = "reflection-worker"
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RuntimeConsumerCognitive RuntimeConsumer = "cognitive-worker"
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@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ services:
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SECRET_BACKEND_ROOT: /run/secrets
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volumes:
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- assistant_core_secrets:/run/secrets:ro
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- assistant_control_plane_service_secrets:/run/control-plane-secrets:ro
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- assistant_research_sources:/var/lib/research-sources:ro
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networks:
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shared:
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@@ -138,6 +139,9 @@ services:
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volumes:
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assistant_core_secrets:
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external: true
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assistant_control_plane_service_secrets:
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name: assistant_control_plane_service_secrets
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external: true
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assistant_research_sources:
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name: assistant_research_sources
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external: true
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@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ services:
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depends_on: { postgres: { condition: service_healthy } }
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volumes:
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- assistant_core_secrets:/run/secrets:ro
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- assistant_control_plane_service_secrets:/run/control-plane-secrets:ro
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/healthz >/dev/null && wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/readyz >/dev/null"]
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interval: 10s
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@@ -247,8 +248,18 @@ services:
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# External mutation credentials belong here only via Portainer/Docker secrets/env injection.
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depends_on: [core-runtime, continuity-runtime, notification-receiver]
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volumes:
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- assistant_control_plane_service_secrets:/run/control-plane-secrets:ro
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- assistant_notification_writer_secret:/run/notification-writer:ro
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secret-control-plane:
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profiles: ["secret-control-plane"]
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build: { context: .., dockerfile: deploy/images/runtime.Dockerfile, args: { TARGET: secret-control-plane, SOURCE_REVISION: "${ASSISTANT_SOURCE_REVISION:-unknown}" } }
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user: "0:0"
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restart: "no"
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command: ["ensure"]
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volumes:
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- assistant_control_plane_service_secrets:/run/control-plane-secrets
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cognitive-worker:
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build: { context: .., dockerfile: deploy/images/runtime.Dockerfile, args: { TARGET: cognitive-worker, SOURCE_REVISION: "${ASSISTANT_SOURCE_REVISION:-unknown}" } }
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restart: unless-stopped
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@@ -363,6 +374,9 @@ volumes:
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assistant_nats:
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assistant_core_secrets:
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external: true
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assistant_control_plane_service_secrets:
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name: assistant_control_plane_service_secrets
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external: true
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assistant_notification_receipts:
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assistant_notification_writer_secret:
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external: true
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@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -euo pipefail
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# This is the only production writer for the dedicated control-plane machine
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# credential volume. It never receives, prints, or exports a secret value.
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BASE_DIR="${BASE_DIR:-/home/m/assistant-deploy}"
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REPO_DIR="${REPO_DIR:-$BASE_DIR/repo}"
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ENV_FILE="${ENV_FILE:-$BASE_DIR/production-compose.env}"
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COMPOSE_FILE="$REPO_DIR/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml"
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VOLUME="assistant_control_plane_service_secrets"
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ACTION="${1:-ensure}"
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case "$ACTION" in
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ensure|rotate) ;;
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*) echo "unsupported machine credential action" >&2; exit 2 ;;
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esac
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[[ -f "$ENV_FILE" ]] || { echo "production compose environment is missing" >&2; exit 1; }
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[[ -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" ]] || { echo "production compose file is missing" >&2; exit 1; }
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compose() { docker compose --env-file "$ENV_FILE" -f "$COMPOSE_FILE" "$@"; }
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# `docker volume create` is idempotent and does not inspect or expose content.
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docker volume create "$VOLUME" >/dev/null
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revision="$(git -C "$REPO_DIR" rev-parse HEAD)"
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ASSISTANT_SOURCE_REVISION="$revision" compose build --build-arg "SOURCE_REVISION=$revision" secret-control-plane >/dev/null
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if [[ "$ACTION" == "rotate" ]]; then
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# Only bounded, non-secret rotation reasons can reach the audit trail.
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reason="${ROTATION_REASON:-owner-requested-rotation}"
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case "$reason" in
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owner-requested-rotation|exposure-detected) ;;
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*) echo "invalid rotation reason" >&2; exit 2 ;;
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esac
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ASSISTANT_SOURCE_REVISION="$revision" compose --profile secret-control-plane run --rm --no-deps secret-control-plane rotate -reason "$reason"
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else
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ASSISTANT_SOURCE_REVISION="$revision" compose --profile secret-control-plane run --rm --no-deps secret-control-plane ensure
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fi
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -euo pipefail
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# Regression: the wrapper accepts only an operation name and never places a
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# plaintext credential on a Docker/Compose command line.
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script="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)/provision-machine-credential.sh"
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tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
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trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT
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mkdir -p "$tmp/bin" "$tmp/repo/deploy"
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cp "$script" "$tmp/repo/deploy/provision-machine-credential.sh"
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printf 'placeholder\n' > "$tmp/repo/deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml"
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printf 'placeholder\n' > "$tmp/env"
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cat > "$tmp/bin/docker" <<'SH'
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "${CAPTURE:?}"
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SH
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cat > "$tmp/bin/git" <<'SH'
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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printf '0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567\n'
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SH
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chmod +x "$tmp/bin/docker" "$tmp/bin/git" "$tmp/repo/deploy/provision-machine-credential.sh"
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capture="$tmp/capture"
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PATH="$tmp/bin:$PATH" CAPTURE="$capture" REPO_DIR="$tmp/repo" ENV_FILE="$tmp/env" "$tmp/repo/deploy/provision-machine-credential.sh" ensure >/dev/null
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grep -qx 'volume create assistant_control_plane_service_secrets' "$capture"
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grep -q -- '--profile secret-control-plane run --rm --no-deps secret-control-plane ensure' "$capture"
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if grep -Eqi '(token=|password=|secret=|authorization:)' "$capture"; then
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echo "provisioning wrapper passed credential material" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env bash
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set -euo pipefail
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# Safe diagnostics only: artifact existence/readability and mount topology.
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# This script never reads or prints credential content.
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TOKEN_PATH="/run/control-plane-secrets/control_plane_service_token"
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VOLUME="assistant_control_plane_service_secrets"
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authorized=(assistant-core-runtime-1 assistant-commit-runtime-1)
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unauthorized=(assistant-creator-web-1 assistant-cognitive-worker-1 assistant-research-runtime-1 assistant-continuity-runtime-1 assistant-agent-worker-1)
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for container in "${authorized[@]}"; do
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docker inspect "$container" >/dev/null
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docker exec "$container" sh -c "test -r '$TOKEN_PATH'"
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docker inspect -f '{{range .Mounts}}{{if eq .Name "assistant_control_plane_service_secrets"}}{{.Destination}} {{.RW}}{{end}}{{end}}' "$container" | grep -qx '/run/control-plane-secrets false'
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done
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for container in "${unauthorized[@]}"; do
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docker inspect "$container" >/dev/null
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if docker inspect -f '{{range .Mounts}}{{println .Name}}{{end}}' "$container" | grep -qx "$VOLUME"; then
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echo "unauthorized runtime has the control-plane credential mount" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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done
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echo "machine credential mount topology verified"
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@@ -1 +1 @@
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{"task_file":"dev/tasks/GEN2-COGNITIVE-003-restore-local-medium-invocation.json","task_id":"GEN2-COGNITIVE-003","task_revision":3}
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{"task_file":"dev/tasks/GEN2-SECRETS-001-local-machine-credential-provisioning.json","task_id":"GEN2-SECRETS-001","task_revision":2}
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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{
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"task_id": "GEN2-SECRETS-001",
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"task_revision": 2,
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"architecture_revision": "ARCH-GEN2-000",
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"base_repo_revision": "gen2-integration",
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"risk_tier": "E",
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"intent": "Provide an idempotent, local-only, cryptographically secure machine-credential provisioner and rotation mechanism on the existing protected Docker secret control plane, initially for the delegated control-plane service token, without creating a second semantic owner or exposing a secret value.",
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"requirement_ids": ["REQ-GEN2-SECRETS-001-LOCAL-MACHINE-CREDENTIALS", "REQ-GEN2-AUTHORITY-001-DELEGATED-CONTROL-PLANE"],
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"allowed_change_scope": {
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"modules": ["technical protected secret file backend", "production deployment/bootstrap secret provisioning", "targeted Core/Commit service-authentication mount wiring", "targeted tests and evidence"],
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"paths": ["platform/secrets/**", "contracts/secrets/types.go", "cmd/secret-control-plane/**", "cmd/core-runtime/main.go", "cmd/commit-runtime/control_plane_authority.go", "deploy/images/runtime.Dockerfile", "deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml", "deploy/docker-compose.candidate-slot.yml", "deploy/provision-machine-credential.sh", "deploy/provision-machine-credential_test.sh", "deploy/verify-machine-credential.sh", "docs/CREDENTIALS_AND_SECRETS.md", "docs/evidence/**", "development/GEN2_TASK_INDEX.md", "dev/ACTIVE_TASK.json", "dev/tasks/GEN2-SECRETS-001-local-machine-credential-provisioning.json"]
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||||
},
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||||
"forbidden_change_scope": {
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"paths": ["architecture/ARCHITECTURE_CONSTITUTION.md", "architecture/architecture-registry.yaml", "architecture/architecture-registry.json", "cmd/devctl/**", "contracts/authority/**", "modules/authority/**", "adapters/postgres/**", "database/**", "modules/identity/**", "modules/capability/**", "cmd/cognitive-worker/**", "cmd/creator-web/**", "UI", "V1 retirement", "GEN2-EVOLVE-005", "Gen3/**", "go.mod", "go.sum"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"allowed_architecture_delta": {"new_cross_module_dependencies": 0, "new_canonical_owners": 0, "new_privileges": 1, "new_third_party_dependencies": 0, "new_database_owner_roles": 0},
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"contracts": {"consume": ["existing CredentialRef and FileResolver", "existing Docker protected-volume deployment mechanism"], "may_change": ["typed SecretPurpose/consumer metadata only if required for the provisioner"]},
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"semantic_owner": "No new semantic owner is introduced. platform/secrets remains a technical bootstrap/resolution mechanism; Identity, Authority, Capability and Configuration ownership remain unchanged.",
|
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"canonical_state": ["credential values live only in protected local artifacts, never in Configuration, Memory, context, PostgreSQL, Compose environment, Git, logs or evidence", "machine authentication is distinct from Authority grants", "metadata/audit is separate from the value and contains no plaintext or reversible material", "the control-plane token is mounted read-only only to Core and Commit runtimes"],
|
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"state_transitions": ["ABSENT -> ACTIVE version one via idempotent CSPRNG provisioning", "ACTIVE -> ROTATING -> ACTIVE new version after atomic artifact replacement and controlled verification", "ACTIVE -> COMPROMISED/REVOKED -> replacement version with audit retained"],
|
||||
"side_effects_and_privileges": ["a one-shot local control-plane container may create or rotate only its dedicated external Docker volume", "Core and Commit get read-only mounts; all other runtimes receive no mount", "no plaintext environment variable is added"],
|
||||
"persistence_and_migrations": ["no application database schema or canonical writer changes", "secret metadata and append-only audit reside separately from the secret value inside the protected control-plane volume", "rollback retains prior metadata and revokes only after a verified replacement"],
|
||||
"failure_retry_restart": ["restart is idempotent and preserves the active artifact", "partial writes are avoided by atomic replacement", "a missing or unreadable artifact fails service authentication closed", "rotation never emits a credential and leaves a valid active artifact on failure"],
|
||||
"assumptions": ["docker.cin.su permits creation of a dedicated external Docker volume by the existing production deployment control plane", "the runtime image can execute a one-shot local provisioner as the control-plane writer", "the existing protected secret volume pattern is the approved production mechanism"],
|
||||
"acceptance_scenarios": ["missing credential is generated once with crypto/rand and then reused across restart", "metadata and audit are separate from the value", "Core and Commit mounts are read-only and no other runtime mounts the dedicated token volume", "rotation accepts the new credential and rejects the old credential", "logs and diagnostics redact known secret headers/fields", "a valid service credential alone does not bypass the existing delegated Authority grant checks"],
|
||||
"required_tests": ["targeted go test ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane", "targeted go vet ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane", "compose config validation", "provisioner shell regression", "preflight", "check-diff", "independent", "git diff --check"],
|
||||
"terminal_gap_states": ["BLOCKED_BY_ARCHITECTURE_GAP", "BLOCKED_BY_SPEC_GAP", "BLOCKED_BY_MISSING_CAPABILITY", "BLOCKED_BY_CONFLICT", "REQUIRES_MIGRATION_DECISION"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
|
||||
# DOMOVOY Gen2 — Task Index
|
||||
|
||||
## GEN2-SECRETS-001 — Local Machine Credential Provisioning & Rotation
|
||||
|
||||
Bounded post-M5 remediation. Provides the technical protected-secret control-plane mechanism required by `GEN2-AUTHORITY-001`; it does not change semantic ownership or grant Authority.
|
||||
|
||||
Это исполняемый индекс task packets. `ARCH-GEN2-000` соответствует разделу `GEN2-000` Master Plan: префикс `ARCH-` нужен текущему `devctl`, чтобы последующие packets могли ссылаться на него через `architecture_revision`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Порядок | Task | Milestone | Gate | Base ref | Зависимость | Файл |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ Each privileged runtime gets only its required secret/capability bindings. `comm
|
||||
|
||||
The Core SELF learning repository uses the existing `assistant_core_secrets` volume and credential-reference mechanism with `self_role` and `credential://domovoy/self/db-password/v1`. The secret is consumed from the fixed `/run/secrets/self_db_password` path; its value is never placed in Compose environment, Git, logs or ordinary configuration. The role and schema already exist; this wiring does not create a role or broaden privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Delegated non-interactive control-plane work is separately authenticated. The local `secret-control-plane` one-shot control-plane service provisions `control_plane_service_token` with `crypto/rand` into the dedicated external `assistant_control_plane_service_secrets` volume. The token artifact is mode `0400`; metadata and audit are separate protected files and contain no value or reversible fingerprint. Only `core-runtime` and the existing Authority/Commit runtime mount that volume read-only at `/run/control-plane-secrets`; no model, Skill, SELF, creator-web, cognitive-worker or research-runtime receives the mount. Compose carries only the non-secret credential reference `credential://domovoy/control-plane/service-token/v1`.
|
||||
|
||||
The provisioner is idempotent: restart reuses an existing safe active artifact. Rotation creates a new value by atomic replacement, records non-secret metadata/audit, and never accepts a plaintext environment variable. The service token is not a Creator session, cannot impersonate a human, and never grants Authority by itself. Removing or rotating the token disables/refreshes service authentication; revoking the durable Authority grant also blocks new delegated operations without deleting audit history.
|
||||
|
||||
Creator authentication secrets are stored in the external Docker volume `assistant_core_secrets` and mounted read-only only at `/run/secrets` in `core-runtime`. The production container environment contains `_FILE` paths, not the secret values. Files are owned by runtime uid 100/gid 101 with mode 0400. `CREATOR_USERNAME` is not secret and remains an environment value. Development may continue to use direct environment values, but a direct value and its matching `_FILE` setting must never be configured together.
|
||||
|
||||
The PostgreSQL off-host backup passphrase is generated randomly and stored as CurrentUser DPAPI ciphertext at `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Domovoy\postgres-backup-key.dpapi.json`. An atomic copy of that DPAPI ciphertext, never the plaintext passphrase, is retained at `\\nas\MST\codex\_backups\domovoy\keys\postgres-backup-key.dpapi.json`. The passphrase is never stored in Git, the production Docker host, a scheduled-task argument, or NAS plaintext. The NAS backup directory receives only GnuPG AES-256 ciphertext and a non-secret integrity manifest. Recovery therefore requires both the NAS artifacts and the authorized Windows DPAPI profile.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
# GEN2-SECRETS-001 — local machine credential provisioning
|
||||
|
||||
Date: 2026-08-31
|
||||
|
||||
## Design evidence
|
||||
|
||||
`platform/secrets` is the existing technical protected-file mechanism. This
|
||||
task extends it without adding a semantic Secrets owner, a database table, or
|
||||
a Configuration/Memory writer.
|
||||
|
||||
The dedicated Docker volume is named
|
||||
`assistant_control_plane_service_secrets`. Its sole writer is the one-shot
|
||||
`secret-control-plane` control-plane container. Its only consumers are
|
||||
`core-runtime` and `commit-runtime`, mounted read-only at
|
||||
`/run/control-plane-secrets`. The metadata directory is distinct from the
|
||||
token artifact and records purpose, owner, version, consumers, status,
|
||||
generation method, and non-secret audit actions only.
|
||||
|
||||
The provisioner uses `crypto/rand`, writes via an atomic file replacement,
|
||||
and has no plaintext environment input. It reports only safe operation status.
|
||||
The data policy marks the artifact as not indexable, embeddable, retrievable,
|
||||
or model-visible.
|
||||
|
||||
## Local FAST evidence
|
||||
|
||||
The following checks completed successfully before production execution:
|
||||
|
||||
- targeted `go test ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
|
||||
- targeted `go vet ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
|
||||
- POSIX shell regression for the provisioning wrapper, executed under Git
|
||||
Bash because the Windows WSL shim cannot translate the mapped workspace;
|
||||
- static Docker Compose validation for production and candidate files.
|
||||
|
||||
No credential value, fingerprint, length, header, or plaintext environment
|
||||
value was read, printed, copied, committed, or included in this evidence.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user