feat(secrets): provision local machine credentials
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The Core SELF learning repository uses the existing `assistant_core_secrets` volume and credential-reference mechanism with `self_role` and `credential://domovoy/self/db-password/v1`. The secret is consumed from the fixed `/run/secrets/self_db_password` path; its value is never placed in Compose environment, Git, logs or ordinary configuration. The role and schema already exist; this wiring does not create a role or broaden privileges.
Delegated non-interactive control-plane work is separately authenticated. The local `secret-control-plane` one-shot control-plane service provisions `control_plane_service_token` with `crypto/rand` into the dedicated external `assistant_control_plane_service_secrets` volume. The token artifact is mode `0400`; metadata and audit are separate protected files and contain no value or reversible fingerprint. Only `core-runtime` and the existing Authority/Commit runtime mount that volume read-only at `/run/control-plane-secrets`; no model, Skill, SELF, creator-web, cognitive-worker or research-runtime receives the mount. Compose carries only the non-secret credential reference `credential://domovoy/control-plane/service-token/v1`.
The provisioner is idempotent: restart reuses an existing safe active artifact. Rotation creates a new value by atomic replacement, records non-secret metadata/audit, and never accepts a plaintext environment variable. The service token is not a Creator session, cannot impersonate a human, and never grants Authority by itself. Removing or rotating the token disables/refreshes service authentication; revoking the durable Authority grant also blocks new delegated operations without deleting audit history.
Creator authentication secrets are stored in the external Docker volume `assistant_core_secrets` and mounted read-only only at `/run/secrets` in `core-runtime`. The production container environment contains `_FILE` paths, not the secret values. Files are owned by runtime uid 100/gid 101 with mode 0400. `CREATOR_USERNAME` is not secret and remains an environment value. Development may continue to use direct environment values, but a direct value and its matching `_FILE` setting must never be configured together.
The PostgreSQL off-host backup passphrase is generated randomly and stored as CurrentUser DPAPI ciphertext at `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Domovoy\postgres-backup-key.dpapi.json`. An atomic copy of that DPAPI ciphertext, never the plaintext passphrase, is retained at `\\nas\MST\codex\_backups\domovoy\keys\postgres-backup-key.dpapi.json`. The passphrase is never stored in Git, the production Docker host, a scheduled-task argument, or NAS plaintext. The NAS backup directory receives only GnuPG AES-256 ciphertext and a non-secret integrity manifest. Recovery therefore requires both the NAS artifacts and the authorized Windows DPAPI profile.
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# GEN2-SECRETS-001 — local machine credential provisioning
Date: 2026-08-31
## Design evidence
`platform/secrets` is the existing technical protected-file mechanism. This
task extends it without adding a semantic Secrets owner, a database table, or
a Configuration/Memory writer.
The dedicated Docker volume is named
`assistant_control_plane_service_secrets`. Its sole writer is the one-shot
`secret-control-plane` control-plane container. Its only consumers are
`core-runtime` and `commit-runtime`, mounted read-only at
`/run/control-plane-secrets`. The metadata directory is distinct from the
token artifact and records purpose, owner, version, consumers, status,
generation method, and non-secret audit actions only.
The provisioner uses `crypto/rand`, writes via an atomic file replacement,
and has no plaintext environment input. It reports only safe operation status.
The data policy marks the artifact as not indexable, embeddable, retrievable,
or model-visible.
## Local FAST evidence
The following checks completed successfully before production execution:
- targeted `go test ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
- targeted `go vet ./platform/secrets ./cmd/secret-control-plane`;
- POSIX shell regression for the provisioning wrapper, executed under Git
Bash because the Windows WSL shim cannot translate the mapped workspace;
- static Docker Compose validation for production and candidate files.
No credential value, fingerprint, length, header, or plaintext environment
value was read, printed, copied, committed, or included in this evidence.