cmd/agent-canary/main.go

@@ -6,12 +6,16 @@ import (
 	"flag"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"git.cin.su/m/Assistant/adapters/postgres"
+	secretcontracts "git.cin.su/m/Assistant/contracts/secrets"
 	"git.cin.su/m/Assistant/contracts/work"
 	"git.cin.su/m/Assistant/modules/work/application"
 	"git.cin.su/m/Assistant/modules/work/ports"
+	platformsecrets "git.cin.su/m/Assistant/platform/secrets"
 )
 
 type memoryStore struct{ writes int }
@@ -37,7 +41,12 @@ func main() {
 	var store ports.ExecutionStore = &memoryStore{}
 	var closeStore func()
 	if *postgresMode {
-		repository, err := postgres.OpenWork(context.Background(), postgres.ContinuityConfig{Host: os.Getenv("POSTGRES_HOST"), Port: os.Getenv("POSTGRES_PORT"), Database: os.Getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE"), User: os.Getenv("WORK_POSTGRES_USER"), Password: os.Getenv("WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD")})
+		password, err := resolveDatabasePassword()
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
+			os.Exit(1)
+		}
+		repository, err := postgres.OpenWork(context.Background(), postgres.ContinuityConfig{Host: os.Getenv("POSTGRES_HOST"), Port: os.Getenv("POSTGRES_PORT"), Database: os.Getenv("POSTGRES_DATABASE"), User: os.Getenv("WORK_POSTGRES_USER"), Password: password})
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
 			os.Exit(1)
@@ -67,3 +76,27 @@ func main() {
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}
 }
+
+func resolveDatabasePassword() (string, error) {
+	if _, ok := os.LookupEnv("WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD"); ok {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD direct environment secret is forbidden")
+	}
+	path, ref := os.Getenv("WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE"), os.Getenv("WORK_POSTGRES_CREDENTIAL_REF")
+	if path == "" || ref == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE and WORK_POSTGRES_CREDENTIAL_REF are required")
+	}
+	root := os.Getenv("SECRET_BACKEND_ROOT")
+	if root == "" {
+		root = "/run/secrets"
+	}
+	cleanRoot := filepath.Clean(root)
+	cleanPath := filepath.Clean(path)
+	if cleanPath != cleanRoot && !strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, cleanRoot+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("database password file escapes protected secret root")
+	}
+	resolver, err := platformsecrets.NewFileResolver(cleanRoot)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return resolver.ResolveFile(secretcontracts.SecretFileRef{CredentialRef: secretcontracts.CredentialRef(ref), Purpose: secretcontracts.SecretPurposeDatabasePassword, Consumer: secretcontracts.RuntimeConsumerWorkWorker, Path: cleanPath})
+}

cmd/agent-canary/main_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+package main
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestResolveDatabasePasswordRejectsDirectEnvironmentSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD", "literal-secret")
+	if _, err := resolveDatabasePassword(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("direct database password environment variable was accepted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveDatabasePasswordRejectsPathOutsideProtectedRoot(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	t.Setenv("SECRET_BACKEND_ROOT", root)
+	t.Setenv("WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE", filepath.Join(root, "..", "outside"))
+	t.Setenv("WORK_POSTGRES_CREDENTIAL_REF", "credential://domovoy/work/db-password/v1")
+	if _, err := resolveDatabasePassword(); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("database password path outside protected root was accepted")
+	}
+}

deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml

@@ -99,8 +99,12 @@ services:
       POSTGRES_PORT: "5432"
       POSTGRES_DATABASE: ${POSTGRES_DB:-assistant}
       WORK_POSTGRES_USER: work_role
-      WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${WORK_DB_PASSWORD}
+      WORK_POSTGRES_CREDENTIAL_REF: credential://domovoy/work/db-password/v1
+      WORK_POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE: /run/secrets/work_db_password
+      SECRET_BACKEND_ROOT: /run/secrets
     depends_on: { postgres: { condition: service_healthy } }
+    volumes:
+      - assistant_core_secrets:/run/secrets:ro
 
   agent-worker:
     build: { context: .., dockerfile: deploy/images/runtime.Dockerfile, args: { TARGET: agent-worker, SOURCE_REVISION: "${ASSISTANT_SOURCE_REVISION:-unknown}" } }

dev/ACTIVE_TASK.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "task_file": "dev/tasks/DEV-000193-fleet-live-degraded-evidence.json",
-  "task_id": "DEV-000193",
+  "task_file": "dev/tasks/DEV-000194-agent-canary-protected-storage.json",
+  "task_id": "DEV-000194",
   "task_revision": 1
 }

dev/tasks/DEV-000194-agent-canary-protected-storage.json

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{
+  "task_id": "DEV-000194",
+  "task_revision": 1,
+  "architecture_revision": "ADR-0018",
+  "base_repo_revision": "c1db571a39514e65156123b7f9394645183cf2ab",
+  "risk_tier": "E",
+  "intent": "Move the explicit production Agent Execution dry-run canary from direct database secret environment input to protected file/CredentialRef storage and preserve durable lease/callback evidence.",
+  "requirement_ids": ["Agent Execution runtime and recovery", "protected canary configuration", "durable lease/callback canary"],
+  "allowed_change_scope": {"modules": ["agent-canary", "deployment"], "paths": ["cmd/agent-canary/main.go", "cmd/agent-canary/main_test.go", "deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml", "dev/ACTIVE_TASK.json", "dev/tasks/DEV-000194-agent-canary-protected-storage.json"]},
+  "forbidden_change_scope": {"paths": ["architecture/**", "security/**", "database/**", "modules/**", "contracts/**", ".gitea/**"]},
+  "allowed_architecture_delta": {"new_cross_module_dependencies": 0, "new_canonical_owners": 0, "new_privileges": 1, "new_third_party_dependencies": 0, "new_database_owner_roles": 0},
+  "contracts": {"consume": ["existing protected secret resolver", "existing ExecutionStore and dry-run canary contract"], "may_change": ["agent-canary runtime configuration"]},
+  "semantic_owner": "work-agent-execution",
+  "canonical_state": ["work.agent_dispatch_intents", "work.agent_leases", "work.agent_callback_heads"],
+  "state_transitions": ["explicit canary -> durable dispatch intent -> lease -> heartbeat callback -> result callback"],
+  "side_effects_and_privileges": ["manual opt-in dry-run only; protected database credential read; no external provider or source mutation"],
+  "persistence_and_migrations": ["none"],
+  "failure_retry_restart": ["missing/invalid protected secret fails before database open; direct secret env is rejected; canary remains explicit opt-in"],
+  "assumptions": ["the production compose secret volume already contains the work database credential reference used by agent-worker"],
+  "acceptance_scenarios": ["direct password environment is rejected", "path outside protected root is rejected", "compose renders canary with protected file/ref only", "production opt-in canary writes lease and callback evidence", "normal agent-worker remains recovery-only without an external bridge"],
+  "required_tests": ["go test ./...", "go vet ./...", "go run ./cmd/devctl preflight -active dev/ACTIVE_TASK.json", "go run ./cmd/devctl check-diff -active dev/ACTIVE_TASK.json", "go run ./cmd/devctl check-architecture", "go run ./cmd/devctl independent", "git diff --check", "CI", "production canary and public health check"],
+  "terminal_gap_states": ["BLOCKED_BY_MISSING_CAPABILITY", "BLOCKED_BY_SPEC_GAP"]
+}